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INTRODUCTION
Although early state constitutions were important and
ambitious documents for their time, the development of state
constitutional law stagnated after the drafting and adoption of the
federal constitution., As the doctrine of federalism has resurfaced,
however, states have begun to turn to their constitutions to grant
more protection for their citizens.2 The states' criminal constitutional
1. Ken Gormley, ed., State Constitutions and Criminal Procedure: A Primer for the 21st
Century, 67 Or. L. Rev. 689, 691 (1988). The application of the Bill of Rights has impeded the use
of state constitutional law further. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of States as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548 (1986);
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1144-48 (1985).
2. See generally Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme
Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 19
(1989); Gormley, 67 Or. L. Rev. 689 (cited in note 1); Abrahamson, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1148-89
(cited in note 1); Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment
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laws have changed significantly and continue to evolve
today.3
In the 1960s, the Warren Court expanded basic protections for
criminal defendants by finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 4 The Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment by the states.5 The Court extended the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to criminal defendants,6 held that
this privilege also requires police to give warnings to suspects prior to
custodial interrogations,7 and applied the double jeopardy clause to
states.8 The Court extended the Sixth Amendment to give criminal
defendants further rights: to be represented by an attorney,9 to be
confronted by the witnesses against them,o to have a speedy trial," to
have a trial by an impartial jury,12 and to have a compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in favor of the defense.13 During this period,
states hardly had time to consider what protections their own
constitutions might give to criminal defendants because the Supreme
Court was expanding the federal rights so rapidly to citizens accused
of state-law crimes.
Following this plethora of decisions, however, the Burger and
Rhenquist Courts began to limit the rights of criminal defendants
on Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63
Tex. L. Rev. 1025, 1025 n.1 (1985) (citing several relevant articles).
3. Gormley, ed., 67 Or. L. Rev. at 695-96 (cited in note 1).
4. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 541-45 (cited in note 1).
5. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The Court cited the Robinson case in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972), to strike down the death penalty by fully
incorporating the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 241
(Douglas, J., concurring). The Court later limited that view in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
186-87 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J.) (holding that imposing the death
penalty for murder did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in all circumstances);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J.)
(holding that imposition of the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J.) (same).
6. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The Court noted that it "has not hesitated to re-
examine past decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the
preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when they added
the Amendment to our constitutional scheme." Id. at 5.
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
8. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
10. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
11. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967).
12. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966).
13. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
796 [Vol. 47:795
1994] SPECIAL PROJECT 797
rather than further expanding those rights,'4 and those Courts
sometimes have refused to provide clear guidelines to the states. 15
Thus, many states have responded by turning to their own
constitutions to extend more protection to criminal defendants.16
Perhaps this shift is appropriate considering that the framers
intended the federal constitution to limit the power of the federal
government while courts and commentators perceive the state
constitutions to grant citizens affirmative rights. 17
In general, states have the right to disregard federal precedent
in any area of concurrent jurisdiction when they support their
judgment with adequate and independent grounds.1a Furthermore, a
14. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 547 (cited in note 1). See, for example, Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985) (holding that an admission of a suspect who was not given Miranda
warnings may be admissible if the statement was not coerced and was repeated after the Miranda
warnings were given); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (creating a "public safety"
exception to the Miranda warning requirements); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223-26 (1971)
(holding that statements from a defendant who was not given Miranda warnings could be used to
impeach that defendant).
Since the Harris decision, some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court has
diluted Miranda's principles. See, for example, Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 Vand.
L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (1985); David Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and
Countertrends, 13 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 405, 406-08 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. 99, 100-01. At least one commentator has asserted
that the Supreme Court should consider overruling Miranda. Caplan, 38 Vand. L. Rev. at 1467-
76. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 495-98 (1977); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions Some
Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L. J. 371,374 (1984).
Of all the criminal constitutional amendments, the Fourth Amendment has sustained the
most direct attack. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 547. See, for example, United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (holding that courts will not necessarily suppress the fruits of a search
when the search is based on a police officer's reasonable reliance on a warrant not supported by
probable cause); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976) (holding that a citizen's
private papers may be seized and introduced as evidence against him); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that citizens do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their bank records); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-25 (1976) (holding that police
searches based on consent are constitutional even if consent is not knowing or intelligent). See
also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (holding that it is not cruel and unusual
punishment to sentence a habitual bad-check writer to life in prison); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 410-14 (1972) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (holding that a person may be convicted of a
crime by a jury vote that is not unanimous).
15. See, for example, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975) (refusing to provide
guidelines for determining when questioning may be renewed if a defendant has chosen to remain
silent). See also Malcolm S. Dorris, Note, The Declining Miranda Doctrine: The Supreme Court's
Development of Miranda Issues, 36 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 259, 260 (1979).
16. Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 495 (cited in note 14). In fact, Justice Brennan has stated
that he believes the "Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism
should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the breach." Brennan, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 548 (cited in note 1).
17. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 549 (cited in note 1).
18. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1875) (enumerating seven
rules for reviewing state court decisions). See also Abrahamson, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1156-69 (cited
in note 1) (discussing the states' experimentation with constitutional law); Utter, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
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federal court does not have the power to review the judgment of a
state supreme court when a state ground sufficiently supports its
holding. 9 Federal protection of civil liberties is only the minimum,
and states are free to surpass these rulings if the states' actions do not
conflict with federal law2 ° and if the Supreme Court has not imposed
specific restrictions.21 Realistically, without the protective forces of
state law, citizens' full realization of liberties is not guaranteed.21
With regard to criminal constitutional law, the Supreme Court
has held specifically that states may impose greater restrictions on
police powers than required by the federal constitution.23 In fact,
many states have used their state constitutions to justify departure
from federal decisions even when the language of their constitutions is
essentially the same as the federal constitution. 4 Occasionally, those
same states subsequently have reversed their decisions to require the
same level of protection given by the United States Supreme Court.
This Special Project addresses four significant criminal
constitutional issues in which the states have chosen to depart, at
least temporarily, from the Supreme Court's determination of the
constitutional rights that must be afforded criminal defendants. In
each of these areas of criminal constitutional law, this Special Project
at 1025-26 (cited in note 2); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
995, 995 (1985).
19. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2; Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 501 & n.80 (cited in note 14)
(citing Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate
and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 977,980-82 (1985).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J. 873,873-75 (1975); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421, 435 (1974); Collins, 54 Miss.
L. J. at 406-08 (cited in note 14); Reich v. City of Freeport, 388 F. Supp. 953, 955 (N.D. IlM. 1974);
United States ex rel. Pascal v. Burke, 90 F. Supp. 868, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
20. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 548 (cited in note 1). This principle was introduced first
by Justice Bradley, who stated that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed .... It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
21. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (holding that a state cannot impose greater
restrictions when the Supreme Court specifically has refrained from imposing them). See also
Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 550 (cited in note 1).
22. Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 491, 503 (cited in note 14). Justice Brennan also concludes
that the series of decisions in the 1960s indicates that "there exists in modern America the
necessity for protecting all of us from arbitrary action by governments more powerful and more
pervasive than any in our ancestors' time." Id. at 495.
23. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719, 728 (stating that "a State is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards") (emphasis in the original). See also Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Pollock, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 980-82 (cited in note 19).
24. Abrahamson, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1169 (cited in note 1). See generally Pollock, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. at 982 (cited in note 19).
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examines the development of federal protections, the later stagnation
of the federal courts, the evolution of state's decisions based on their
respective constitutions, and the effect of these states' decisions on
criminal defendants.
This Special Project first considers canine sniffs in the context
of an individual's right to be free from unreasonable government
searches. 25 The Supreme Court has refused to apply a standard of
suspicion below probable cause in determining the reasonableness of
certain types of police investigatory activities. Because the
governmental costs of acquiring probable cause outweigh the
offsetting benefits to individual interests when the searching activity
intrudes only minimally on individual privacy, the Court has
exempted less intrusive police activities, such as canine sniffs, from
the rigors of the Fourth Amendment, subjecting them to no judicial
scrutiny whatsoever. By contrast, several states have found sniffs to
be searches under their state constitutions but have applied a
reasonable suspicion standard, as described in Terry v. Ohio.26 This
Note explores the development of and policies supporting the
reasonable suspicion standardn for canine sniffs, suggests that courts
should use this standard in minimally intrusive investigatory
searches, such as canine sniffs, proposes a test that courts can use to
determine when a search warrants application of this lower standard,
but warns against applying the reasonable suspicion standard too
broadly.
The Project also considers another Fourth Amendment issue:
the constitutionality of an undercover law enforcement official's
conducting electronic surveillance in an individual's home without a
warrant or consent from that individual.27 In United States v. Wite, 18
the Supreme Court held that this surveillance is not unconstitutional.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, many states interpreted their state
constitutions to prohibit the admission of evidence obtained from
warrantless consensual electronic surveillance. Some of those states
subsequently reversed their decisions, returning to the Supreme
Court's interpretation. This Note discusses the state and federal
decisions, identifies factors that state courts have used to determine
25. See Kenneth L. Pollack, Stretching the Terry Doctrine to the Search for Evidence of
Crime: Canine Sniffs, State Constitutions, and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 47 Vand. L.
Rev. 803 (1994).
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. See Melanie L. Black Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveillance Experiment: State
Courts React to United States v. White, 47 Vend. L. Rev. 857 (1994).
28. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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the constitutionality of warrantless consensual electronic surveillance,
and analyzes the state courts' trend toward returning to the Supreme
Court's ruling.
This Project next examines the Fifth Amendment right of a
criminal defendant to remain silent or to have an attorney present
during custodial interrogations. 9 Although Miranda v. Arizonal° has
received much criticism, many states actually have expanded Miranda
because of a concern for the continuing problem of coerced confessions.
Unfortunately, most states have focused on the quantity rather than
the quality of information given to criminal defendants when
determining whether that defendant's rights have been preserved.
This Note examines New York's rule of People v. Arthur,3 1 discusses
the policy concerns accompanying adoption of this standard, and
ultimately recommends widespread adoption of this rule.
Finally, this Project discusses the various states' reaction to
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United
States v. Leon.32 After weighing Leon's reasoning against the
problems arising from the adoption of the exception, this Note
examines the appropriateness of the reactive rulings of most states
that have rejected Leon on state constitutional grounds., A number
of states have not decided whether to adopt the exception, and this
Note ultimately encourages those states to reject Leon.
Clearly, the states have been very active in determining
whether they will extend more rights to their citizens than the federal
courts require, with varying results depending on the criminal
constitutional issue under consideration. The states should be allowed
to continue their analyses for a number of reasons: the federal rulings
are only minimum standards for the states to follow; the federal courts
have failed to provide clear guidelines forthose minimum standards;
the states often want to extend more protection to their criminal
defendants; the legal community generally perceives the state
constitutions as granting affirmative rights to their citizens; and,
otherwise, citizens have no guarantee of full liberties. The ultimate
consequence of allowing the states to continue this experimentation is
29. See Lorraine J. Adler, New York's Loyalty to the Spirit of Miranda: Simply the Best for
Twenty-Five Years, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 889 (1994).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. 22 N.Y.2d 325,239 N.E.2d 537 (1968).
32. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
33. See Leigh A. Morrissey, State Courts Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds: A
Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 917 (1994).
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to achieve justice by establishing the proper balance between law
enforcement effectiveness and individual freedom.
S. Carran Daughtrey*
Special Project Editor
* I would like to thank Professor Hall and the editors of this Project for their help.
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